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Cooper: Damages--The Per Diem Method of Arguing Pain and Suffering
CASE COMMENTS

With the increasing judicial review of police detection methods
evidenced by the search and seizure and confession cases, these
problems of the undercover method of police detection probably
will receive more attention. Courts again will have to balance the
interest in effective law enforcement and the interest in a fair opportunity for defense for the accused. The courts now seem less likely
to allow what Justice Roberts termed "the reprehensible methods"
used by the undercover agents. Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 453 (1932).
ForrestHansburyRoles
Damages-The Per Diem Method of Arguing Pain and Suffering
Ps brought an action to recover damages for injuries received in
an automobile accident caused by D's negligence. The district court
allowed Ps"counsel to use the per diem basis in his argument to recover damages for pain and suffering. In addition, charts were used
to demonstrate the per diem computations. The judgment for Ps
was reversed on the ground that argument designed to mislead jury
into believing that proper award for pain and suffering was a matter
of precise determination constituted reversible error. Johnson v.
Colglazier, 348 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1965).
The basic approach of the per diem method is to break down pain
and suffering into units of time. The total units are calculated from
P's expected life span, as computed from an annuity table. In instances where P is not expected to incur pain and suffering for the
remainder of his lifetime, computations are based upon the expected
duration of discomfort.
The majority in the principal case based its opinion on Botta v.
B runner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958). The New Jersey court
held that in using such argument P's counsel was basing figures
upon mere speculation without supporting evidence. Also, New
Jersey courts forbid reference by counsel to the ad damnum clause
in the complaint.
West Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals in Crum v. Ward,
146 W.Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961), followed the New Jersey
court by holding that counsers use of the per diem argument constituted reversible error. See 65 W. VA. L. REv. 237, 238 (1962).
The controversy concerning use of the per diem method is generally
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familiar to other state courts. Pro-Botta decisions are listed in
Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1331, 1339-44 (1958). A list of cases favorable
to the per diem method may be found in the instant case at pp.
428-29. The holding in the principal case represents the majority
view of the courts today.
The Botta decision gives the jury no guidelines for determining
damages for pain and suffering. Typically, the court instructs the
jury to return a reasonable sum for pain and suffering, but gives
no guidelines other than the jury's common sense and sound judgment. Phillips, Botta in Focus, TRLj LAw. GUYME 69, 78 (1962).
Without any criterion to evaluate damages for pain and suffering it
hardly can be said that the jury properly can weigh elemental
factors in arriving at their decision.
Some advocates claim that use of per diem has led to excessive
verdicts. However, it is not uncommon for appellate courts to find
verdicts excessive in cases where the per diem method is not used.
In the latter cases the jury's only basis for formulating their verdict
is conscience and common sense. In one case a $300,000 judgment
was entered for P. Of this sum $207,000 represented an award for
pain and suffering. Upon appeal this sum was held excessive.
Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185, 190 (Fla. 1953). A Missouri case
further illustrates this problem. The jury returned a verdict for P
in the amount of $68,000. By remittitur the trial court reduced the
verdict to $48,000. Upon appeal this amount was further reduced
to $38,000. Beard v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 323 S.W.2d 732, 746
(Mo. 1959). Thus, there is evidence to support the proposition that
a jury working by conscience and common sense alone may return
excessive verdicts.
The typical unaided juror is uncertain as to what would be a
proper verdict. As reported in the article by Phillips, supra at 80-81,
a poll was conducted of jurors to determine their reasoning in
reaching a sum for pain and suffering. One juror said that he gave
P the amount of his bills because he was not told how much P
suffered in terms of money. Another said that he was never injured
and did not know what to give. The opponents of the per diem
method claim that such method leads to speculation. It is apparent
that jurors would be speculating as to the worth of pain and
suffering if they did not have knowledge of the compensable
factors of which pain and suffering are comprised.
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Anti-per diem advocates claim there is no market place for pain
and suffering. The West Virginia court in following the Botta
decision stated that there is no measure by which pain and suffering can be calculated, and any effort to attach a price tag thereto
must be lost in emotion, fancy and speculation. Crum v. Ward,
supra at 429, 123 S.E.2d at 23. This proposition was rebuffed
during a panel discussion at the Eighteenth Annual Law Institute
of the University of Tennessee College of Law and the Knoxville
Bar Association. A panelist, Mr. Francis H. Hare, states that there
are situations in life when pain and suffering are put on one side
of the scale and money on the other. The following illustration
was used. Before modem treatments were perfected, there were
very few effective anaesthetics. Thus, many people died in anguish
and suffering. Today there are anaesthetics which reduce or completely counteract pain and suffering. To get the benefit of such
drugs, money is required. For example, a dentist may charge $3
for a shot of novacaine which brings temporary relief of pain.
Suppose a person suffers from arthritic pain and the cost of the
medicine to relieve the pain is $10 per day. It is reasonable to
assume that such pain is incurable and will torment the person for
the rest of his natural life. The amount of money required to
alleviate the pain over his remaining lifetime easily could be
ascertained by the per diem method. Mr. Hare further stated that
the courtroom was the only place where he had ever seen the fact
denied that freedom from pain and suffering was worth large sums
of money. 25 TENN. L. REv. 220, 227-230 (1958). Thus, one
method of computing damages for pain and suffering would be
to calculate in dollars that sum which is the cost of medicine or
treatment to alleviate it.
The per diem method has been attacked by the argument that
it is a mathematical formula which gives the jury the illusion of
certainty. Botta v. Brunner, supra. However, a true mathematical
formula is exact and subject to no variation. There is no illusion of
certainty in a mathematical formula. Obviously, the per diem
method is not a true mathematical formula. It does not give a
specific sum of money, but serves as a valuable guideline for the
jury. To say that use of per diem gives to a jury an illusion of
certainty is to insult their intelligence by implying that they
stupidly misconstrue an attorney's illustration as a mathematical
formula. Phillips, supra at 83-84.
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In some states, including West Virginia, counsel may discuss the
total sum asked for, but may not mention processes through which
the jury might reason to obtain that amount. Johnson v. Brown,
75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754 (1959); 64 W. VA. L. REv., supra.
The purpose of counsel's argument should be to provide a reasonable means by which the jury can arrive at a lump-sum figure. To
do this effectively, counsel should be able to state either what the
figure ought to be or which factors would legitimately enable the
jury to fix a specified or general figure. The statement of a lump
sum should be no more permissive than the statement of a sum
based upon a per diem basis. The whole is equal to the sum of
its parts, and frequently an analysis or synthesis of individual elements leads to a more thorough understanding of the composite
whole.
Advocates of the anti-per diem method claim that because there
is no evidentiary basis for converting pain and suffering into
monetary terms, allowing counsel to suggest the amount of the
award would transcend the evidence. 12 RUTGEmS L. Rv. 522
(1958). No well defined limits exist which confine an advocate in
his argument. Counsel is normally allowed to draw fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence. 53 AM. Jmi. Trial § 463
(1945). To say that a verdict must be consistent with the evidence
is to indicate that such verdict must be inferable from it. Because
the inference drawn by the jury results in a specific sum of money,
it is evident that a lawyer should be allowed to comment on such
inferences from evidence. 12 RuTGERs L. REv., supra. Normally,
if seriously injured, P will testify that he endures pain each and
every day at all conscious times. D's counsel will attempt to narrow
the time for pain and suffering, and the inevitable result is to indirectly provide proof of pain on a fixed, time-segmented basis.
Phillips, supra at 84. This time-segmented basis for pain and suffering which has been developed from evidence is easily adaptable
to the per diem method. If so, the jury would be given a reasonable guideline upon which to base their verdict.
Defense counsel have voiced wide disapproval of the per diem
method. Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82, 88 (Fla. 1959). However, the defense may make advantageous use of the per diem
method of computing damages for pain and suffering. The defense
could thus persuade a jury that P is requesting an excessive
sum. Phillips, supra at 86. Counsel is free to use any argument

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol68/iss2/29

4

1966]

Cooper: Damages--The Per Diem Method of Arguing Pain and Suffering
CASE COMMENTS

based upon inferences from evidence. Thus, the art of advocacy
would play its rightful part in presenting a reasonable guideline
to the jury.
None of the pro-Botta arguments are adequate to refute the value
of the per diem method of ascertaining damages for pain and suffering. The instant case held that use of the per diem approach in
computing damages for pain and suffering was reversible error
even though the jury's verdict was not per se excessive. Judge
Brown in dissenting said, "... . if the evil feared is excessive verdicts,
then the cure ought to be directed against the product, not the
practice." Excessive verdicts may be cured by a trial judge's
proper use of discretion in preventing unreasonable arguments
based on the per diem approach. The court's instructions to the
jury should clarify the fact that the per diem argument by counsel
was merely for illustrative purposes and not evidence of a sum
certain. The use of the per diem method in West Virginia would
be of valuable assistance to juries and would take the formulation
of a verdict for pain and suffering from the realm of speculation.
James Truman Cooper

Libel and Slander-The Innocent Construction Rule
As an employee of the defendant corporation, P was responsible
for calculating the cordage of wood shipped to the corporation mill
in another city. His figures compared favorably with those of the
mill for a period of five years. Suddenly, for some inexplicable
reason, an unusual discrepancy persisted. As a consequence P was
discharged. At a meeting of some corporation employees, D made
reference to the trouble involving P and linked it with another
problem involving inventory shortage where an employee had been
dismissed under a strong suspicion of stealing. Although D maintained that his intent was only to charge P with negligence or inefficiency, witnesses who knew the facts concerning the inventory
shortage inferred that D's statement was an accusation that P was
guilty of stealing pulpwood. In the slander action brought by P
against D and the corporation, the trial court denied D's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Held, affirmed. Where
words allegedly slanderous may be given either an innocent or a
slanderous interpretation, the jury must determine the sense in
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